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     Executive Summary 
 In this report, we investigate the impact of proposed tolls levied on users of the 
replacement for the Brent Spence Bridge, including impacts on commuting patterns and overall 
economic activity in Northern Kentucky.  Overall, consistent with economic literature, the 
economic impact of the improved bridge will be positive and the toll, while slightly mitigating 
that impact, is likely to have only small effects on commuting patterns, trucking and retail and 
food service industries. 
• We estimate that the net impact of the new bridge and the toll under our estimated likely 
scenarios would reduce commuter traffic by less than 2%, and possibly increase traffic 
by 1%. 
• We estimate that the net impact of the new bridge and the toll under our likely scenarios 
would decrease trucking by less than 3% for trips made over the bridge: only a portion of 
overall trucking in the region. 
• Our results suggest that while there may be some over-river shopping in Northern 
Kentucky, there are also consumers in Northern Kentucky shopping in Cincinnati: while 
the toll may reduce trips, it is unlikely to have an impact on retail or accommodation and 
food service in the region.  
• We were also asked to investigate the impact of the Davis-Bacon act on the overall cost 
of the bridge.  We find that the construction costs may be 10 to 15% higher due to Davis-
Bacon wage requirements.
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Introduction 
 The Ohio Department of Transportation and the Kentucky Transportation cabinet have 
announced plans to rebuild the Brent Spence Bridge and approaches.  The Brent Spence Bridge 
spans the Ohio River connecting carrying traffic on I-75 and I-71 between Northern Kentucky 
and Cincinnati in Southern Ohio.  The Cincinnati Metropolitan Area consists of five counties in 
Ohio, seven counties in Kentucky and three counties in Indiana for a total of fifteen counties 
spanning three states (see Figure 1).   The two freeways, I-75 and I-71, which cross the Brent 
Spence Bridge pass through seven of these fifteen counties including Boone, Gallatin, Grant and 
Kenton counties in Kentucky and Butler, Hamilton and Warren counties in Ohio.   Three other 
bridges (see Figure 2) carry interstate traffic across the Ohio river between Kentucky and 
counties in the Cincinnati Metropolitan Area: the Carol C. Cropper Bridge (I-275) between 
Boone County Kentucky and Dearborn County Indiana on the West side of the MSA;  the Daniel 
Carter Beard Bridge (Big Mac Bridge, I-471) between Campbell County and Hamilton County 
just east of the Spence Bridge; and the Combs-Hehl Bridge (I-275) between Campbell County in 
Kentucky and Hamilton County in Ohio on the East side of the MSA.   Three other bridges (the 
Clay Wade Bailey Bridge carrying U.S. 42 and 127, the John A. Roebling Bridge; and the 
Taylor-Southgate Bridge carrying U.S 27), span the Ohio River between Kenton and Campbell 
counties in Kentucky and Hamilton County in Ohio.  Five of these seven bridges (the exception 
being the two I-275 bridges) connect downtown Cincinnati with Covington and Newport in 
Kentucky.  Covington is on the west side of the Licking River in Kenton County, while Newport 
is on the east side in Campbell County. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Figure 1:  Cincinnati MSA  
Figure 2:  Cincinnati MSA Bridges 
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 The proposed renovation of the Brent Spence Bridge and its approaches is clearly a 
needed improvement in infrastructure.  The Federal Highway Administration lists the Brent 
Spence Bridge as functionally obsolete.  The structure was originally designed to carry 
approximately 80,000 vehicles per day and in 2005 it carried 172,000 vehicles per day (National 
Bridge Inventory Data Base).   The proposed project will improve traffic flow and safety along 
this important corridor.   
 The Center for Business and Economic Research was asked to examine the impact of a 
toll on this bridge on economic activity in Northern Kentucky.  In particular concern arises about 
the impact of the toll on residents living in Northern Kentucky who commute into Cincinnati for 
work as well the impact to potential customers from Ohio for retail shopping and entertainment 
venues in Northern Kentucky.  The trucking industry is also of importance to Northern 
Kentucky, as it constitutes a large employment category and interacts with manufacturing and 
wholesale goods industries.   
 In Component 1, we review the economic literature on highway improvements and tolls.  
The literature on tolls is not well developed, but does find that consumers and workers do not 
appear to be sensitive to tolls.  We also review literature on the overall economic impact of 
bridge and road improvements and any interactions with tolls.  We find little literature 
specifically on tolls, however, the general finding of the literature is that highway and bridge 
improvements have a net positive impact on economic activity that is not mitigated by toll roads.  
Component 2 of this report addresses the likely impact of a toll on commuting patterns and 
Component 3 addresses the broader economic impacts on the region. 
 Finally, in Component 4, we were asked to investigate the potential costs of the Davis-
Bacon prevailing wage requirements on the cost of the Bridge itself.   The economic literature is 
remarkably wide in its estimates, ranging from no effects to effects as large as 25% or more.  Our 
calculations suggest between 10 and 15% higher costs due to the higher wages.  However it is 
possible that this is an overstatement if firms respond by making different hiring decisions or by 
using fewer workers and more technology.   
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Component 1: Review of Literature and Background 
 
 Component 1 is composed of a literature review of Components 2 and 3 including the 
impact of the toll on commuting patterns and the broader economic impacts of the toll.  We 
divide this literature review into two parts: in Part 1 we focus on the impact of tolls on 
commuting, other trips in automobiles (typically privately owned), and general traffic patterns 
and flows.  In the Part 2 we summarize the small literature on the broader economic impacts of 
tolls. 
 
Part 1: Impact of Tolls on Private Automobile Trips and Traffic. 
 
 Perhaps surprisingly, a trip or drive is easily thought of like any other economic good.  
An individual chooses to make a particular trip when the cost of the trip is lower than the overall 
benefit of making that trip.  Economists capture this idea in a demand curve, where the amount 
of the good consumed depends on the price or cost of that good.  Typically, as the price rises, the 
consumption of a good falls.    
 
 In the case of simple goods, like candy bars, the price of the good is easily measured as 
the dollar figure one must pay the merchant to purchase that item.  In the case of a trip, the cost 
has a number of more complicated components.  We focus on three, although some authors (see 
for example Burris, 2003) identify as many as seven.  An obvious first component is the fuel cost 
necessary for the trip itself.  In many ways, this is one of the most obvious costs of any trip made 
in a private automobile.  Fuel costs are relatively simple to estimate based upon average fuel 
efficiency and travel times.   
 
 The second component is the time spent in the automobile during the trip.  This is an 
example of what economists refer to as an opportunity cost.  While driving an automobile, the 
consumer is able to do very little else and so “gives up” whatever they would have done were the 
trip not undertaken.  Economists use a variety of approaches to applying a dollar figure to time.  
Many are based upon the wage or earning potential of the individual.   In the case of 
transportation, economists have arrived at a number of estimates, most of which are based upon 
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hourly earnings estimates.  These estimates can be further refined by examining commuting 
patterns by income.   
 
 The third component is tolls paid for travel on the roads, and of course this is the primary 
component we will examine in the study below.  A number of studies have examined this 
component specifically (some of these are detailed below).  There are a number of general points 
about this component.  The elasticity (or sensitivity) of travel to road tolls is not markedly 
different than any other cost component.  Trips appear to be slightly more sensitive to changes in 
tolls than changes in fuel prices.  However, trips appear to be more sensitive to time costs than 
tolls: increases or decreases in time costs due to traffic and other consideration have a larger 
impact on travel choice than tolls.  This is understandable as time costs in general are a larger 
component of the overall trip.   
 
 Burris (2003) provides a nice summary of the literature on estimated trip price elasticity 
by each of the components outlined above.  We reproduce components of Burris’ Tables one and 
two in our Table 1.  Additionally, we report estimates from more recent literature focusing on the 
elasticity of tolls.  The elasticity estimates reported in Table 1 measure the percentage change in 
the number of trips made for a 1% change in the price of the trip.  For example, an elasticity of   
-0.25 implies that a 10% increase in costs results in a 2.5% decrease in the number of trips made.  
Estimates in Table 1 for elasticity for toll costs range from very small negative numbers (even a 
few positive numbers) to as high as –0.78.  Most range from around -0.15 to -0.33 with a cross 
study average of -0.21.  As also can be seen, the estimates focusing on toll roads are not 
markedly dissimilar to estimates using other costs.  Travel time elasticities do appear to be 
somewhat higher, although this difference may be due to the difficulty of estimating the value of 
time, rather than actual differences in sensitivities.  In general these are “inelastic” values over 
the entire range.  Elasticities between 0 and -1 represent cases where a 1% change in price yields 
less than a 1% change in consumption.  For the case of travel, in general the literature has found 
that consumers are not very responsive to changes in the price of travel, even in the long run.   
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Table 1.1:  Elasticity Estimates 
 
Study Type of Estimate Elasticity 
Toll Elasticities 
  (Burris, Review) 
  Wuestefeld and Regan (1981) Toll Road Toll -0.03 to -0.31 
Wuestefeld and Regan (1981) Toll Bridges -0.15 to -0.31 
Gifford and Talkington (1996) Golden Gate Bridge -0.15 
Harvey, G.W. (1994) San Fran Bay Bridge -0.05 
Wildur Smith Associates Various -0.1 to -0.35 
(Our review) 
  
Hirschman et al (1995) 
New York City Bridge and 
Tunnel -0.03 to -.26 
McArthur et al (2013) Norway Bridges and Ferries -0.24 
Loo (2003) Hong Kong Tunnels 0.054 to -0.309 
Odeck and Brathen (2008) 
Norway Trunc Roads and 
Motorways  -0.14 to -0.78 
   Other Elasticities 
  (Burris Review) 
  Johansson and Schipper (1997) Fuel -0.05 to -0.55 
Goodwin (1992) Fuel -0.16 to -0.33 
Luk and Hepburn (1993) Fuel -0.1 
De Jong and Gunn (2001) Fuel -0.16 to -0.26 
Ingram and Liu (1999) Fuel -0.05 to -0.55 
Lee, D.B. (2000) Travel Time -0.38 to -0.68 
Goodwin (1996) Travel Time -0.27 to -1.33 
(Our review) 
  McArthur et al (2013) Travel Time -0.24 
   Hirschman et al (1995) Light Trucks -0.07 to -0.54 
Hirschman et al (1995) Heavy Trucks -0.0 to -0.6 
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 A number of studies are worth highlighting.  The Wuestefeld and Regan (1981) study 
specifically examines a broad sample of toll bridges and roads across the U.S. while the 
Hirschman et al (1995) study examines traffic patterns into and out of Manhattan across the 
bridges and through tunnels.  These two studies, in many ways, are most comparable to the 
proposed toll here.  The Hirschman et al (1995) study also has advantages in that certain bridges 
and tunnels had less expensive or free close substitutes (as does the Brent Spence Bridge), while 
other bridges had fewer substitutes.  This allows us to examine how the presence of alternative 
routes would impact the traffic. 
   
 The Odeck and Brathen (2008) study is particular relevant in that it focuses on cases in 
which a new toll was implemented.  The average was somewhat higher than found in other 
studies, and also represents a longer run estimate than many other studies.  While a drawback of 
this study is that it derives from Norwegian data, as can been seen in our table, estimates are 
remarkably stable around the world and the variation is most likely from differences specific to 
the bridge rather than cultural or economic differences between countries.   
 
 The Hirschman et al (1995) study is one of the few studies which examines the impact on 
trucking.  In many ways it may be less than ideal in this case in that trucking into and out of 
Manhattan is likely to be different – and less sensitive to price changes - than trucking in and 
around Cincinnati.  They find a range from very small to around -0.6.   
 
Part 2: Broader Economic Impact Studies 
 
 As Cherrington (2006) notes, “the body of literature specifically examining toll road 
impacts is still relatively small.”  Cherington (2006) provides a relatively comprehensive review 
of this literature.  In general, the literature finds that the imposition of tolls is generally coupled 
with expansion of the road system infrastructure or is designed to reduce traffic in high volume 
areas.  In both of these cases, the overall economic benefit on the region is typically positive: 
commute times are reduced either through the toll itself or through the combination of the toll 
and the expanded infrastructure.  However, as noted by Cherrington et al. (2006), the broad 
economic impacts of tolls are often highly case specific and situation dependent.    
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 There is a larger literature on the impact of transportation development infrastructure.  In 
general studies find that highway infrastructure (either new or improvements) lead to enhanced 
economic growth (both employment and population) near the development (Weiss, 2005; 
Rychnowsky et al, 2003; Chandra and Thompson, 1998; Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt, 1997 & 2003).  
Boarnet and Chalermpong (2001) find that road improvements in general increase the 
willingness to pay, and hence the use of the roads, by consumers.  Tolls offset the increased 
demand induced by the improvement and thus the economic impact is relatively small.  Vadali 
(2008) finds that improved access from road improvements and expansions, even when tolls are 
imposed, generally increases residential property values near the corridors.   
 
 Pugh and Fairburn (2008) examine the impact of a new toll road on employment and 
economic activity.  Like Boarnet and Chalermpong (2001) and Vadali (2008) they find that the 
access benefits outweigh the toll cost substantially.  Also, in agreement with previous literature, 
they find that the development impacts are highly localized near the development. 
 
 Unfortunately these studies are small and clearly findings are highly specific to the 
situation.  However, the general finding is that tolls have very little broader economic impact, 
and what impact they may have is lost in the overall impact from improved access.  Many 
authors hypothesize that the tolls reduce congestion and separate high value users (who use the 
toll road) from low value users (who may shift to other trips).  In so far as businesses 
(transportation and warehousing) and commuters are likely to be high value users of the 
improved bridge, there are reasons to believe that the economic impact of the toll will be 
minimal. 
 
Component 2:  Commuting Patterns and the Likely Impact of a Toll. 
 
Current Commuting Patterns 
 
 The Brent Spence Bridge typically carries over 95,000 automobiles across the Ohio River 
on any given day.  The weekday average is 128,832 automobiles while the weekend average is 
still over 113,959 automobiles (based on bridge traffic counts provided by the Ohio-Kentucky- 
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Indiana Regional Council of Governments).  These counts represent a variety of types of 
travelers likely dominated by commuter travel during the work-week. 
 
 Table 2.1 presents summary statistics from count data collected for the Ohio-Kentucky-
Indiana Regional Council of Governments (OKI) on the Brent Spence Bridge from April 19, 
2013 through May 19, 2013.  The data were collected using radar and hose (pneumatic tube 
traffic counter) methods and provide reliable estimates of traffic over time, across days, type of 
vehicle, and direction of travel.  We summarize these data by considering the distribution across 
weekdays and weekends and during morning (6am-10am) and evening (2pm-6pm) peak periods.   
Forty-eight percent of weekday traffic on the bridge is concentrated during the two rush hour 
periods (which represent 33% of the total day).  As one would expect weekend totals are 20% 
lower, but still represent robust traffic.  During morning rush hour, more traffic is northbound, 
while during evening hours more traffic is southbound.  Approximately 17,240 autos head 
northbound during the morning commute and a nearly symmetric 17,510 cross southbound in the 
evening.  Similarly approximately 12,427 cross southbound in the morning while over 15,000 
cross northbound in the evening.  We note in general a northbound bias in all types of traffic.  
This may be due to physical data collection problems, or to something structural such as 
diversion to other bridges for southbound traffic or returning snowbirds (referring to travel that 
may be seasonal in nature) during the time of data collection. 
 
Table 2.1: Traffic Counts on Brent Spence Bridge 
    
Weekday Weekday 
  
Weekdays Weekends Morning Rush Afternoon Rush 
NorthBound Autos 66,225 59,959 17,240 15,691 
 
Trucks 17,716 10,390 3,740 3,663 
 
Total 83,941 70,349 20,980 19,354 
      Southbound Autos  62,607 54,001 12,427 17,510 
 
Trucks 14,488 6,558 2,400 3,938 
 
Total 77,094 60,558 14,827 21,448 
Total 
     
 
Autos  128,832 113,960 29,667 33,201 
 
Trucks 32,204 16,948 6,140 7,601 
 
Total 161,036 130,908 35,807 40,802 
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 Figure 3 presents hourly automobile traffic by direction for weekdays.  The northbound 
peaks during the 6am-10am period, while the southbound peaks during the 2pm – 6pm period.  
The southbound traffic shows a secondary peak period between 7am and 9am, while the 
northbound traffic shows a secondary peak period from 3pm to 6pm.  Figure 4 presents weekend 
traffic for automobiles.  While there is a slight northbound peak early in the day (9am to 1pm), 
the southbound peak (roughly noon to 5pm) is less pronounced.  The weekend pattern clearly has 
fewer commuters than the weekday pattern.   
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 Commuters clearly represent a significant portion of traffic on the Brent Spence Bridge.  
The patterns apparent in the traffic counts suggest that roughly 17,000 Kentuckians cross the 
bridge twice each weekday to work in Ohio and over 12,000 Ohioans cross the bridge twice each 
weekday to work in Kentucky.  This is clearly an underestimate as it ignores individuals who 
shift their commute time away from these peak periods.   
 
 In order to obtain commuting estimates that capture individuals using the bridge off peak, 
we used data from the American Community Survey (ACS).  The ACS is collected every year on 
an on-going basis by the United States Census Bureau.  Survey respondents are asked a variety 
of questions, including the county of residence, the county of work and their average commute 
time.  The U.S. Census compiles county to county commuting patterns and provides them on the 
Census Bureau web page.  Using these data we compiled a matrix of commuting patterns for the 
Cincinnati Metropolitan area.  While these data identify the residence and work locations of 
commuters, we do not have knowledge of the specific route traveled.  
 
 Table 2.2 presents the residence to work counts available by county for the Cincinnati 
MSA.  Table 2.3 summarizes these into northbound and southbound commuters who are likely to 
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be Brent Spence Bridge users.  Approximately 53,900 commuters make their way from counties 
in Kentucky to counties in Ohio or Indiana each day and approximately 29,200 commuters travel 
from counties in Ohio or Indiana to counties in Kentucky.   As noted above, we do not know the 
specific route taken by commuters but we estimate that as many as 35,000 Kentuckians may 
commute into Ohio and Indiana across the bridge and as many as 22,700 may commute from 
Ohio or Indiana across the bridge to Kentucky.  The somewhat higher numbers obtained via the 
ACS as compared to the “rush hour” estimates from the traffic count data may be due to two 
likely factors.  First, and most likely, are commuters who follow a different schedule than the 
typical 9 to 5 weekday workday.  Individuals with flexible work hours, those who work late or 
early shifts and those who work weekends would not be captured by the “rush hour” counts we 
compiled in Table 2.1.  It is quite obvious that the counts in Table 2.1 are likely to be 
undercounts for exactly these reasons. We expect that this is the highest portion and point to the 
fact that the hourly counts during nearly all times are higher on weekdays than weekends, but 
that weekend traffic is still robust.  A second possibility is that we are attributing too much traffic 
to the Brent Spence Bridge.  Our estimates are based on crude assumptions that essentially 
amount to having all commuters with jobs in certain counties cross the Brent Spence Bridge.  For 
example, we assume that all commuters from Boone County, Kentucky to Hamilton County, 
Ohio cross the bridge.  Clearly many commuters may cross alternative bridges.  Traffic patterns 
from other bridges suggest that at least some of these commuters do so.  Hence the counts from 
the ACS are likely too high.  
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Table 2.2: Commuting Patterns from the American Community Survey 
  
Work 
 
  
Indiana Kentucky Ohio 
 
Residence Dearborn Franklin Ohio Boone Bracken Campbell Gallatin Grant Kenton Pendleton Brown Butler Clermont Hamilton Warren Total Commuters 
Indiana 
Dearborn 10,030 155 363 1,688 
 
135 
 
7 665 
  
761 156 8,330 152 22,442 
Franklin 476 3,736 
 
101 
    
25 
 
10 692 15 1,615 45 6,715 
Ohio 1,042 8 896 300 
  
9 
 
29 
  
18 48 451 28 2,829 
Kentucky 
Boone 614 
  
30,444 13 1,391 159 464 10,879 19 26 860 597 10,662 490 56,618 
Bracken 13 
  
181 1,310 433 
  
255 127 63 28 
 
231 
 
2,641 
Campbell 99 47 
 
3,878 16 16,028 62 68 6,506 234 16 735 841 14,183 460 43,173 
Gallatin 
   
1,043 
 
7 1,083 72 361 
  
33 
 
123 
 
2,722 
Grant 21 
  
3,027 
 
150 121 4,135 1,409 59 
 
106 15 739 11 9,793 
Kenton 262 
 
6 16,743 14 5,148 46 295 31,736 110 
 
754 937 19,752 467 76,270 
Pendleton 
   
809 73 888 
 
391 604 2,323 
 
38 23 719 15 5,883 
Ohio 
Brown 
   
105 28 133 
 
14 240 7 6,682 373 4,948 3,036 370 15,936 
Butler 164 58 10 732 
 
245 
  
1,087 
  
96,977 1,314 45,965 14,201 160,753 
Clermont 50 
  
1,699 
 
851 
 
47 1,694 
 
522 3,529 37,767 40,247 4,131 90,537 
Hamilton 1,312 60 46 6,736 
 
3,333 16 86 8,260 9 25 20,856 8,176 310,370 11,619 370,904 
Warren 49 
 
7 253 
 
206 
 
3 509 
 
52 10,577 1,857 25,797 40,972 80,282 
Total Commuters 
 
14,132 4,064 1,328 67,739 1,454 28,948 1,496 5,582 64,259 2,888 7,396 136,337 56,694 482,220 72,961 
  
 
Table 2.3:  Commuting Patterns for Northbound and Southbound Travelers that are Possible Brent Spence Bridge Users. 
 
All Commuters Possible Brent Spence Bridge Users 
Northern Kentucky to Ohio & Indiana 53,986 29,252 
Ohio & Indiana to Northern Kentucky 35,002 22,740 
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 Table 2.4 provides estimates of commute times between counties in the Cincinnati area.  
These times were obtained based upon the geographic centroid of the county and using 
MapQuest and taking the fastest trip time.  Commute times within counties are not available 
using this methodology, but are not relevant to the study here (we are concerned primarily with 
commute times between Kentucky and Ohio or Indiana, and particularly those possibly crossing 
the Brent Spence Bridge).  The range is quite high, but the highest numbers are associated with 
low or zero commuters based on Table 2.2 ACS data.  Table 2.5 presents estimates of 
commuting travel time using these data and using the ACS data directly.  The ACS data ask 
respondents the amount of time on their typical commute.  Using the two sources of time 
(MapQuest time and respondent time), we compute estimates of commute times for all workers, 
workers who have an inter-county commute and workers who are likely to commute across the 
Brent Spence Bridge.  The results are quite similar using either the employee weighted 
MapQuest times based on centroids or the actual survey data.  All workers have an average 
commute time just over 20 minutes (21.3 or 22.3).  Those workers making an inter-county 
commute have higher times of either 31.9 or 29.5 minutes, while those likely to be using the 
Brent Spence bridge have times very similar to those of other inter-county commuters of 30.1 
min and 32.2 minutes.  We will use an average commute time of 30 minutes for Brent Spence 
Bridge commuters.
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Table 2.4: Travel Time (in Minutes) between Population Centroids of Counties (using MapQuest and Longitude/Latitude Data from Left) 
  
Indiana Kentucky Ohio 
  
Dearborn Franklin Ohio Boone Bracken Campbell Gallatin Grant Kenton Pendleton Brown Butler Clermont Hamilton Warren 
Indiana 
Dearborn 
 
49 34 37 83 48 63 58 40 76 88 57 61 47 66 
Franklin 49 
 
75 64 109 69 90 85 67 100 109 55 82 56 74 
Ohio 34 75 
 
51 97 62 55 72 54 90 102 71 75 61 80 
Kentucky 
Boone 37 64 51 
 
62 27 31 26 19 50 67 56 40 31 59 
Bracken 83 109 97 62 
 
46 82 73 53 43 62 90 65 65 89 
Campbell 48 69 62 27 46 
 
47 42 17 37 52 50 26 25 49 
Gallatin 63 90 55 31 82 47 
 
30 38 57 86 75 60 51 79 
Grant 58 85 72 26 73 42 30 
 
33 35 81 70 55 46 74 
Kenton 40 67 54 19 53 17 38 33 
 
44 56 49 30 24 51 
Pendleton 76 100 90 50 43 37 57 35 44 
 
84 81 57 56 80 
Ohio 
Brown 88 109 102 67 62 52 86 81 56 84 
 
70 34 66 67 
Butler 57 55 71 56 90 50 75 70 49 81 70 
 
44 32 20 
Clermont 61 82 75 40 65 26 60 55 30 57 34 44 
 
39 40 
Hamilton 47 56 61 31 65 25 51 46 24 56 66 32 39 
 
33 
Warren 66 74 80 59 89 49 79 74 51 80 67 20 40 33 
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Table 2.5:  Estimates of Commuting  Travel Time using MapQuest and ACS Time 
 
  
Work 
  
Indiana Kentucky Ohio 
  
Dearborn Franklin Ohio Boone Bracken Campbell Gallatin Grant Kenton Pendleton Brown Butler Clermont Hamilton Warren 
Indiana 
Dearborn 10,030 155 363 1,688 
 
135 
 
7 665 
  
761 156 8,330 152 
Franklin 476 3,736 
 
101 
    
25 
 
10 692 15 1,615 45 
Ohio 1,042 8 896 300 
  
9 
 
29 
  
18 48 451 28 
Kentucky 
Boone 614 
  
30,444 13 1,391 159 464 10,879 19 26 860 597 10,662 490 
Bracken 13 
  
181 1,310 433 
  
255 127 63 28 
 
231 
 Campbell 99 47 
 
3,878 16 16,028 62 68 6,506 234 16 735 841 14,183 460 
Gallatin 
   
1,043 
 
7 1,083 72 361 
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123 
 Grant 21 
  
3,027 
 
150 121 4,135 1,409 59 
 
106 15 739 11 
Kenton 262 
 
6 16,743 14 5,148 46 295 31,736 110 
 
754 937 19,752 467 
Pendleton 
   
809 73 888 
 
391 604 2,323 
 
38 23 719 15 
Ohio 
Brown 
   
105 28 133 
 
14 240 7 6,682 373 4,948 3,036 370 
Butler 164 58 10 732 
 
245 
  
1,087 
  
96,97
7 1,314 45,965 14,201 
Clermont 50 
  
1,699 
 
851 
 
47 1,694 
 
522 3,529 37,767 40,247 4,131 
Hamilton 1,312 60 46 6,736 
 
3,333 16 86 8,260 9 25 
20,85
6 8,176 310,370 11,619 
Warren 49 
 
7 253 
 
206 
 
3 509 
 
52 
10,57
7 1,857 25,797 40,972 
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Trip Costs 
 We next turn to obtaining estimates of the value of time.  As noted in the literature 
review, various authors have estimated the time costs for commuting at between $12 and $20 per 
hour.  Economists often use earnings income to estimate the opportunity cost of time.  This is 
particularly appropriate here since we are focusing on commuter traffic.  The ACS data also 
provide information on annual income.  Table 2.6 presents the average income for commuters 
likely to cross the Brent Spence Bridge as well as frequencies by income categories.  We also 
present income summaries for commuters of all types in the Cincinnati area.  Overall, workers in 
the Cincinnati area who drive to work have an average annual income level of $46,020.   
Individuals who are likely to be using the Brent Spence Bridge have an average annual income 
of $58,407, this is 27% higher than all workers in the region.  One approach to estimation is to 
use hourly incomes based on these averages.  Average hourly earnings for all Cincinnati workers 
is approximately $22, while for those likely to be using the Brent Spence Bridge we find an 
average of $28 per hour.  We will compute travel time costs using $14 per hour, $18 per hour (a 
common value from the literature), $22 per hour, the overall Cincinnati average wage and $28 
per hour, the higher Brent Spence Bridge commuter average. 
 
Table 2.6: Earnings for Commuters 
 
 
All commuting 
workers in 
Cincinnati 
Likely Brent Spence 
Bridge Users 
N.KY Brent 
Spence 
Average Income $46,020 $58,407 $60,409 
Income Distribution 
   0-$49,999 69.0% 54.5% 51.6% 
$50,000-$99,999 23.6% 35.1% 37.8% 
$100,000-$149,999 4.3% 6.2% 6.7% 
$150,000-$199,999 1.3% 1.6% 1.4% 
$200,000 and up 1.9% 2.6% 2.6% 
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 The final calculation necessary for constructing trip costs are average gasoline costs.   
Gasoline costs vary over time and we use $3.34 per gallon as an estimate based on an internet 
survey of Cincinnati gas prices.  Again using MapQuest, we construct centroid to centroid 
distances for commutes between counties.  Averaging these distances weighted by employment 
for likely Brent Spence Bridge users results in an average commute distance of 21 miles.  If 
average fuel economy is 20 miles per gallon, this would imply an average trip gas cost of $3.51.  
We also use the gas cost from MapQuest.  It is not clear what fuel economy or prices these 
calculations are based on, however, the employment weighted average for these calculations is 
$2.50.  As with our opportunity cost calculation we will use both in order to achieve a range. 
(Tables for miles and gasoline expenditure are in the Appendix Tables 1 and 2 respectively). 
 
 Table 2.7 presents estimated trip costs for a number of scenarios.  Along the left hand 
column we have three “cost structures.”  In all cases we are using a typical 30 minute commute 
time.  Below we discuss implications for longer and shorter times. The low cost structure 
represents a case where we assume the value of an hour of a commuter’s time is $14.  This is one 
of the lowest estimates of commuter time available in the literature.  We also use the lowest gas 
price estimate (derived from the MapQuest estimates) at $2.50.   The Medium 1 and Medium 2 
rows both use an average gas cost of $3, slightly higher than the $2.50 cost. Medium 1 uses a 
$16 per hour value of time.  This was chosen based upon results from the 2012 Texas A&M 
Transportation Institute (TTI) Urban Mobility Study for the Brent Spence Bridge to be 
comparable.  It is also an estimate deriving from the literature.  We also examine two higher 
opportunity costs: $22 and $28 both derived from our estimates of the hourly earnings.  Medium 
2 uses $22 an hour with a $3 cost for gas.  The row with high cost uses $3.50 for gas and the $28 
time cost.
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Table 2.7: Trip Cost 
      
 
No Travel time change No Toll $1 toll $2 toll 
Trip cost 
No Toll: 
Base Cost $1 Toll $2 Toll 
With 3 min 
time gain 
With 6 min 
time gain 
With 3 min 
time gain 
With 6 min 
time gain 
With 3 min 
time gain 
With 6 min 
time gain 
Low 9.50 10.50 11.50 8.80 8.10 9.80 9.10 10.80 10.10 
Medium 1 10.50 11.50 12.50 9.70 8.90 10.70 9.90 11.70 10.90 
Medium 2 14.00 15.00 16.00 12.90 11.80 13.90 12.80 14.90 13.80 
High 17.50 18.50 19.50 16.10 14.70 17.10 15.70 18.10 16.70 
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Table 2.8: Percent Change in Trips 
       
  
No Travel time change No Toll $1 toll $2 toll 
Elasticity Trip cost $1 Toll $2 Toll 
With 3 min 
time gain 
With 6 min 
time gain 
With 3 min 
time gain 
With 6 min 
time gain 
With 3 min 
time gain 
With 6 min 
time gain 
 
Low -1.6% -3.2% 1.1% 2.2% -0.5% 0.7% -2.1% -0.9% 
-0.15 Medium 1 -1.4% -2.9% 1.1% 2.3% -0.3% 0.9% -1.7% -0.6% 
 
Medium 2 -1.1% -2.1% 1.2% 2.4% 0.1% 1.4% -1.0% 0.2% 
 
High -0.9% -1.7% 1.2% 2.4% 0.4% 1.7% -0.5% 0.7% 
          
 
Low -2.6% -5.3% 1.8% 3.7% -0.8% 1.1% -3.4% -1.6% 
-0.25 Medium 1 -2.4% -4.8% 1.9% 3.8% -0.5% 1.4% -2.9% -1.0% 
 
Medium 2 -1.8% -3.6% 2.0% 3.9% 0.2% 2.1% -1.6% 0.4% 
 
High -1.4% -2.9% 2.0% 4.0% 0.6% 2.6% -0.9% 1.1% 
          
 
Low -5.3% -10.5% 3.7% 7.4% -1.6% 2.1% -6.8% -3.2% 
-0.5 Medium 1 -4.8% -9.5% 3.8% 7.6% -1.0% 2.9% -5.7% -1.9% 
 
Medium 2 -3.6% -7.1% 3.9% 7.9% 0.4% 4.3% -3.2% 0.7% 
 
High -2.9% -5.7% 4.0% 8.0% 1.1% 5.1% -1.7% 2.3% 
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 The first panel of table 2.7 presents the various trip costs when there is no change in the 
length of the trip due to the improved infrastructure.  The first column: no travel time change and 
no toll, represents the base cost of a commute over the Brent Spence Bridge as it stands now.   
For a person who values their time at $14 an hour and spends $2.50 on gas for their commute, 
the 30 min commute represents a cost of $9.50.  This implies that a person desiring to make that 
trip would pay up to $9.50 to be instantly transported: avoiding the gas and time costs.  Some 
might argue that this is too low, as it fails to capture other relevant costs such as parking, other 
costs associated with driving an automobile (e.g. insurance, and maintenance costs), and perhaps 
particularly stress and aggravation from the drive itself.  We do not address insurance and 
maintenance type costs as they are in many ways “fixed” costs. In the context here, the worker is 
likely to make some kind of commute, the question is which one.  We attempt to focus upon 
costs specific to the Brent Spence Bridge.  Aggravation costs can be captured using higher value 
of time, as we do in rows two through four.  As can be seen, the primary component of the trip 
cost is the time. 
 
 The second and third columns of the first panel in Table 2.7 represent two toll costs: $1 
and $2.  There is no adjustment in time cost, and this represents the direct cost change in the trip 
from inducing a toll.  This would represent the impact if the new bridge did nothing to reduce the 
travel times (congestion) but the toll was imposed upon commuters (travelers in general).  A $2 
toll for the lowest cost row results in approximately a 21% increase in the cost of the trip.  At the 
other extreme, a $1 toll for the highest cost trip represents a 5.7% increase in the costs.  It is clear 
that the estimated impact of a toll is highly dependent on the assumptions about commuters’ cost 
of time that are used. 
 
 The second panel examines a case where there is no toll, but commuters gain from 
reduced congestion and hence shorter commutes.  According to the TTI Urban Mobility Study, 
the current Brent Spence Bridge has a travel time factor of 1.2.  This implies that congestion at 
the bridge causes a 20% increase in travel time for typical trips.  We use this as an upper bound 
for the gain in time and explore two values of a time gain.  First, a 3 minute time gain 
(representing a 10% improvement) and a 6 minute time gain (representing the full 20% 
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improvement).  Costs go down for each type of trip cost because the commuters reduce their 
travel time.  We also present, in this panel, a trip cost with a 3 minute increase in travel time.  
This represents a case where an individual diverts from the Brent Spence Bridge to one of the 
other bridges.  Here we can see that the slightly higher time costs increase the cost of the trip.  
The reduction in time represents a monetary gain of between $0.70 (for the 3 minute gain at the 
lowest cost trip) and $2.80 (for the 6 minute gain for the highest cost trip).   
 
 The third and fourth panel combine the first and second panels and explore trip costs for 
3 and 6 minute time gains with $1 and $2 tolls.  The $1 toll is offset by the time gain for all the 
two lowest time values for the 3 minute time gain.  The $2 toll is only fully offset for the two 
highest time values when there is a 6 minute time gain.  The largest increase in trip cost would be 
experienced if time value was only $14 per hour, the gain from improved infrastructure was only 
3 min, and a $2 toll was imposed, resulting in an increased cost of $1.30 or 13.7%.  The largest 
decrease in trip cost would be experienced if time value were $28 per hour, a 6 minute time gain 
on the commute occurred, and a $1 toll was imposed, resulting in a decreased cost of $1.80 or 
10.3%. 
 
Estimated Impact on Commuting 
 
 Table 2.8 presents estimates of the reduction in commuter traffic (and potentially other 
types of traffic, see Component 3), using the changes in cost from table 2.7 along with different 
assumptions about the elasticity (price responsiveness) of commuters.  The four vertical panels 
compare to the four panels in the Table 2.7, while the four horizontal panels represent different 
assumptions about the responsiveness of commuters to changes in trip cost (elasticities). The 
lowest elasticity (responsiveness to cost) is 15% which represents a low estimate from the 
literature.  While this is certainly a very unresponsive trip consumer, this may be the best 
estimate for understanding overall commuter behavior.  Most elasticity estimates represent the 
responsiveness of consumers of the particular bridge, road or tunnel.  In this analysis, we are less 
interested in the use of the Bridge as we are in the how the new bridge will impact commuter 
behavior: if they divert from the bridge to another bridge but still make the commute it is treated 
the same for this analysis as if the consumer continued to commute across the bridge.  For parties 
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interested in estimating toll revenue from the bridge, this low estimate is likely too optimistic.  
The -0.25 elasticity represents an average for commuter traffic in the literature.  This may be the 
best estimate for our purposes for a number of reasons.  First it is roughly in the middle for the 
estimates found in the literature.  There are a number of secondary issues here though.  We 
would like to have a long run estimate, which captures not only the immediate response by 
consumers, but also long run patterns of worker and firm location decisions.   Long run 
elasticities are always higher than in the short run, yet most of the estimates from the literature 
are essentially short run estimates.  We are, however, more interested in overall commuting, 
rather than simply commuting on the specific Brent Spence Bridge.  In cases where there were 
no other alternatives to the bridge or tunnel being studies, estimates of consumer responsiveness 
were lower.  Also, most estimates in the literature derive for total bridge traffic, rather than 
specifically commuter traffic.  It has been noted, however, that commuters have lower 
responsiveness to changes in price due to the high value of getting to work.   In thinking about 
“all commuters” crossing the Ohio River between Northern Kentucky and the rest of the 
Cincinnati MSA, we would expect to use a lower (potentially much lower) elasticity to represent 
the overall impact of changes in the Brent Spence Bridge on commuting.  The -0.25 value 
represents these two offsetting effects (long run vs overall commuter impact) well.  The two 
higher elasticities are estimates for more leisure-oriented trips.  The literature finds that 
individuals who are traveling for leisure (such as shopping or entertainment) have higher 
responsiveness to changes in the trip price. 
 
 Focusing on the -0.25 elasticity rows we begin by looking at the first vertical panel 
representing no travel time change but the imposition of a $1 or $2 toll.  For the lowest cost trip 
estimate with no travel time change, a $2 toll would result in a 5.2% decrease in commuter 
traffic.  This is unlikely to be the true net impact of the Brent Spence Bridge project, but does 
represent an important case: what is the impact of the toll after we net out changes in travel time.  
The thought experiment would be “after building the new bridge and operating it for some period 
of time, if a $2 toll was imposed, what would happen to commuter traffic.”  This is the “direct 
effect” of the toll.  However, the 5.2% reduction is the highest estimate in this panel.  As time 
value increases (even without a gain from improved access) the toll becomes a smaller part of the 
total trip cost, and thus reduces the impact.   
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 The second vertical panel of Table 2.8 examines how the potential time gain from the 
improved road impacts commuters.  We certainly expect, and the literature has generally found, 
that reduced time will induce more commutes.  People who before chose jobs or housing 
locations to avoid commutes will change their decision.  Again, focusing on the -0.25 elasticity, 
we see that the shorter commute will induce between 1.8% and 4% more commuters depending 
upon the trip cost assumptions and the improvement in time.  For the lowest trip cost assumption 
with the 3 minute time gain, we will see only a 1.8% increase in commuters.  If the time gain is 6 
full minutes, and the typical commuter has a base trip cost of $17.50 (the high cost trip), we 
would see a 4% increase in commuting.  Using the Medium 1 row, we expect that we would see 
an increase of 1.9% to 3.8% depending upon the gain from less congestion.   
 
 The third and fourth vertical panels of Table 2.8 provide a combination of the two 
offsetting effects: the higher price induced by the toll and the decrease in commute times 
provided by the improved bridge.  Estimates range from a decrease of as much as 3.4% in 
commuting to an increase in commuting by as much as 2.6%.  For a $1 toll, using the Medium 1 
row, we would expect a decrease in commuting of 0.5 percent if the time gain is only 3 minutes, 
and an increase in commuters of 1.4% if the time gain is the full 6 minutes.  We note that here, in 
order to have a zero impact on commuting for a $1 toll the time gain is 3.7 minutes.   
 
 For a $2 toll, commuting may decline by as much as 3.4% or increase by as much as 
1.1% again depending on the base value of time and the amount of time gain from reduced 
congestion.  Focusing on the Medium 1 costs, we note that here the decline in commuters is 
between 1% and 2.9%.  The time gain necessary to offset a $2 toll would be 7.5 minutes which 
seems highly unlikely 
 
 Another approach to consider is what toll would result in no change in commuting for 
different time gains.  This simply compares the dollar value of the trips (see table 2.7).  Again 
focusing on the Medium 1 row and the -0.25 elasticity, a three minute time gain would be 
exactly offset by an $ .80 cent toll.  A six minute time gain would be exactly offset by a $1.60 
toll.   
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 We have focused on the Medium 1 case in our discussion, but we argue that this is likely 
too low a cost for commuters in Cincinnati.  Overall, our estimates place the hourly earnings for 
typical workers in Cincinnati at $22 per hour.  Further, when we limit our sample to individuals 
who are potential Brent Spence Bridge users, the average earnings rise and we find a value of 
time of as high as $28 (on average).  Again focusing on the -0.25 elasticity, those two rows show 
increases in commuters for the $1 toll and somewhere between a 1.6% decrease and a 1.1% 
increase for the $2 toll.  We also note that these estimates do not account well for the psychic 
costs from “bad traffic.”  Congestion and challenging driving raise the costs of commuting by 
more than simply the time difference (3 minutes in bad traffic is worse than 3 minutes when 
traffic flows smoothly and uneventfully).  Since commuting is more likely to occur in poor 
traffic, and the improved bridge is likely to significantly reduce traffic congestion, this argues for 
either using higher values of time (to capture the aggravation of bad traffic) or using larger time 
gains (to account for higher prices for gains from reduced congestion).  In either case, the likely 
net impact would shift toward increases in commuters rather than decreases. 
 
 We draw three specific conclusions from Tables 2.7 and 2.8.  The first is that while tolls 
have an impact, that impact is relatively small compared to the overall cost of a trip.  The largest 
component of the cost is the time value, but the gasoline value itself is larger than even a $2 toll.  
The second is that time gains from decreased congestion on the bridge are likely to offset the 
tolls, if not completely, to an amount resulting in relatively small changes in commuting patterns: 
typically less than 3%.  Finally, the toll itself could be chosen to offset the gain from reduced 
congestion and this toll would likely be over $1 but less than $2.  This is not necessarily the 
optimal toll.  The optimal toll would also include the overall costs of congestion and would 
typically be higher than the toll computed to just balance the gain in time. 
 
 It is important to put the changes into perspective here.  We estimate total commuting 
across the Ohio River via the Brent Spence Bridge to be approximately 57,700 people each day 
(see tables 2.2 and 2.3).  A total of 35,000 are “northbound” while 22,700 are “southbound.”  If 
3% of these from each direction decide to avoid the cross river commute (a seemingly worst case 
scenario), that would reduce commuting by about 1,732 workers: 1,050 northbound and 682 
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southbound.  Given that the overall population of the Northern Kentucky counties in the 
Cincinnati MSA is over 431,000, and the total number of employed in this region is nearly 
200,000, this would seem to have a small impact on Northern Kentucky and in general on the 
Cincinnati Metropolitan Area which has over 2 million in population.  Moreover, three 
additional changes would likely occur: “job swapping”, relocation of residence and finally 
relocation by employers.  Some of the workers will choose to find employment on their side of 
the river.  Since this will occur with both groups, there will be some “job swapping” where 
former northbound commuters take the jobs of former southbound commuters and vice versa.  
There will also be some residential relocations: people who want to keep their jobs, but don’t 
want to commute will move (this is significantly less likely). Here the “swapping” can be 
thought of as well.  On net however, 368 individuals will need to move north.  There is also a net 
force to have firms who employ many northbound commuters to move south of the river (and 
also vice versa, but the net result will be movement of firms into Northern Kentucky).  This 
reduces the costs of employees and makes it possible to hire them at slightly lower wages.  This 
is likely to be a small effect, but it will reduce the net north migration some.  The value of 368 is 
tiny.  It is likely that it will be impossible to even measure this amount were we to do a full 
study.  The overall impact of the toll on commuting, employment and workers is simply very 
small. 
 
Component 3: Broader Economic Impacts of the Bridge and Tolls. 
 
Economic Climate in Northern Kentucky 
 
 There is very little research on how a toll on a bridge or roadway impacts other economic 
activities besides commuting and general use of the bridge or road.  This lack of research is 
somewhat surprising in that one might suspect that this would be a major concern.  However, as 
noted in the literature review, tolls are often associated with improvements in infrastructure and 
the overall economic impact is typically positive.   
 
 In this section we first outline the major economic activities in Northern Kentucky and 
the Cincinnati Metropolitan area.  The focus in this section is on the impacts on Northern 
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Kentucky specifically, and hence our focus is on the six counties in Northern Kentucky which 
are part of the Cincinnati Metropolitan Area.  We focus our attention on four specific industries 
of concern:  Transportation and Warehousing, Retail Trade, Accommodation and Food Service, 
and Arts and Recreation.  Transportation and Warehousing may be impacted by the toll in that 
the costs of tolls to the trucking industry may change that industries’ location choices in the long 
run.   There is concern that retail trade may be hampered by costs of using the bridge.  If 
significant portions of the retail trade industry are due to Ohio residents travelling to Kentucky to 
shop, the increased costs of these trips may reduce their number and hence have an impact on the 
retail trade industry.  Similarly, Northern Kentucky attractions (such as the Aquarium) may draw 
patrons from Ohio and Indiana.  These patrons are also likely to eat at Northern Kentucky 
restaurants and to utilize other accommodation firms.  Again, concern arises that the toll may 
decrease this activity and thus have an impact on this industry. 
 
 Table 3.1 presents total employment by two-digit North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) industries from establishment data (our source for this was the 
Bureau for Economic Analysis (BEA) presentation of U.S. Census Bureau estimates).   The first 
column aggregates employment for the entire Cincinnati MSA.  The second column presents 
employment for all Northern Kentucky counties in the Cincinnati MSA, the third column focuses 
on the three “close in” counties (Boone, Kenton and Campbell), while the fourth column isolates 
Kenton County.  Cincinnati has total employment of 868,014 and a population of 2.1 million.  
Table 3.2 examines which industries are large percentages of employment in the four geographic 
regions.  Overall, the three largest industries in the Cincinnati MSA are Health Care (15% of all 
employment), Manufacturing (12.1%), and Retail Trade (11.8%).  Transportation and 
Warehousing is 3.7% of total MSA employment, Accommodation and Food Service is 9.9% of 
MSA employment, while Arts and Recreation is 2.5%.  For Northern Kentucky, Manufacturing 
(12.7%), Retail Trade (12.5%) and Health Care (12.1%) are again the three largest.  
Transportation and Warehousing in Northern Kentucky is 7.4% of employment, Accommodation 
and Food Service is 11.2%, while Arts and Recreation is 1.5%. 
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Table 3.1: Employment Estimates by Industry 
     Industry Cincinnati MSA N. Kentucky Close In Boone Kenton Campbell 
Agriculture 439 0 0 0 0 0 
Mining 280 0 0 0 0 0 
Utilities 2340 157 157 157 0 0 
Construction 34927 4391 4186 1817 2369 0 
Manufacturing 104752 19361 18469 11465 4580 2424 
Wholesale Trade 50686 10551 10432 7315 2056 1061 
Retail Trade 102214 19095 17697 8395 5386 3916 
Transportation & Warehousing 32469 11364 11131 11131 0 0 
Information 13327 1416 1416 746 441 229 
Finance 48535 7846 7633 3243 3784 606 
Real Estate 11340 2040 1969 728 751 490 
Professional Services 53457 6839 6692 1882 3442 1368 
Management 41060 5274 5274 2036 2971 267 
Waste Services 58744 9594 9473 5318 3287 868 
Education 15253 1465 1465 537 780 148 
Health Care 130548 18485 18184 4781 9936 3467 
Arts and Recreation 18280 2253 2253 842 796 615 
Accommodation & Food Service 86101 17141 17082 6374 6130 4578 
Other Services 29327 5420 5134 2396 1721 1017 
Government (Fed, State, Local) 33661 10066 9334 2457 5854 1032 
NEC 274 43 43 21 15 7 
Total 868,014 153,074 148,024 71,641 54,299 22,093 
Population 2,128,603 431,997 375,935 123,316 161,711 90,908 
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 Table 3.3 provides percentages of the total MSA employment in each industry for the 
three geographic sub-regions of the MSA in Northern Kentucky.  For example, Northern 
Kentucky employment in Transportation and Warehousing is 35% of the entire Cincinnati MSA 
employment in that industry.  Overall, 17.6% of employment in the MSA is in Northern 
Kentucky, while 20.3% of the MSA population resides there.  Clearly, Northern Kentucky 
disproportionately commutes into Ohio for employment.  In addition to Transportation and 
Warehousing, Manufacturing (18.5%), Wholesale Trade (20.8%), Retail Trade (18.7%) and Real 
Estate (18.0%), Accommodation and Food Service (19.9%), Other Services (18.5%) and 
Government (29.9%) each have a higher percentage of the MSA employment in Northern 
Kentucky than the overall employment percentage represented in Northern Kentucky.    Focusing 
on the four industries of concern, we do note that three of them are disproportionately 
represented in Northern Kentucky (Transportation and Warehousing, Retail Trade and 
Accommodation and Food Service).  Arts and Entertainment in Northern Kentucky is 12.3% of 
the overall MSA employment in that industry.  However, it should be noted that except for 
Table 3.2: Industry Percent of Total Employment 
  Industry Cincinnati MSA N. Kentucky Close In Boone Kenton Campbell 
Agriculture 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Mining 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Utilities 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 4.0% 2.9% 2.8% 2.5% 4.4% 0.0% 
Manufacturing 12.1% 12.7% 12.5% 16.0% 8.4% 11.0% 
Wholesale Trade 5.8% 6.9% 7.0% 10.2% 3.8% 4.8% 
Retail Trade 11.8% 12.5% 12.0% 11.7% 9.9% 17.7% 
Transportation & Warehousing 3.7% 7.4% 7.5% 15.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Information 1.5% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 
Finance 5.6% 5.1% 5.2% 4.5% 7.0% 2.7% 
Real Estate 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.0% 1.4% 2.2% 
Professional Services 6.2% 4.5% 4.5% 2.6% 6.3% 6.2% 
Management 4.7% 3.5% 3.6% 2.8% 5.5% 1.2% 
Waste Services 6.8% 6.3% 6.4% 7.4% 6.1% 3.9% 
Education 1.8% 1.0% 1.0% 0.7% 1.4% 0.7% 
Health Care 15.0% 12.1% 12.3% 6.7% 18.3% 15.7% 
Arts and Recreation 2.1% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% 1.5% 2.8% 
Accommodation & Food Service 9.9% 11.2% 11.5% 8.9% 11.3% 20.7% 
Other Services 3.4% 3.5% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 4.6% 
Government (Fed, State, Local) 3.9% 6.6% 6.3% 3.4% 10.8% 4.7% 
NEC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Wholesale Trade and Transportation and Warehousing, the percentage is lower than the 20% of 
population. 
 
Table 3.3:  Region Percent of MSA Employment 
 Industry N.Kentucky Close In Boone Kenton Campbell 
Agriculture 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Mining 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Utilities 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 12.6% 12.0% 5.2% 6.8% 0.0% 
Manufacturing 18.5% 17.6% 10.9% 4.4% 2.3% 
Wholesale Trade 20.8% 20.6% 14.4% 4.1% 2.1% 
Retail Trade 18.7% 17.3% 8.2% 5.3% 3.8% 
Transportation & Warehousing 35.0% 34.3% 34.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Information 10.6% 10.6% 5.6% 3.3% 1.7% 
Finance 16.2% 15.7% 6.7% 7.8% 1.2% 
Real Estate 18.0% 17.4% 6.4% 6.6% 4.3% 
Professional Services 12.8% 12.5% 3.5% 6.4% 2.6% 
Management 12.8% 12.8% 5.0% 7.2% 0.7% 
Waste Services 16.3% 16.1% 9.1% 5.6% 1.5% 
Education 9.6% 9.6% 3.5% 5.1% 1.0% 
Health Care 14.2% 13.9% 3.7% 7.6% 2.7% 
Arts and Recreation 12.3% 12.3% 4.6% 4.4% 3.4% 
Accommodation & Food Service 19.9% 19.8% 7.4% 7.1% 5.3% 
Other Services 18.5% 17.5% 8.2% 5.9% 3.5% 
Government (Fed, State, Local) 29.9% 27.7% 7.3% 17.4% 3.1% 
NEC 15.7% 15.7% 7.7% 5.5% 2.6% 
Total 17.6% 17.1% 8.3% 6.3% 2.5% 
Population 20.3% 17.7% 5.8% 7.6% 4.3% 
 
 In the three close-in counties we see a nearly identical pattern in Table 3.3.  
Approximately 17.1% of MSA employment is in these three counties, while 17.7% of population 
is concentrated here.  For the three close-in counties, we note that Transportation and 
Warehousing again is 34.3% of total MSA employment.  The data reveal that nearly all 
employment in this industry is concentrated in Boone County.  Within the three close in 
counties, Manufacturing (17.6%), Wholesale Trade (20.6%), Retail Trade (17.3%), 
Accommodation and Food Services (19.8%), Other Services (17.5%) and Government (27.7%) 
all remain above the region employment percent.  However, Retail Trade is now only slightly 
above the region employment.  Arts and Recreation remains at approximately 12.3% for these 
counties. 
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Examining each county specifically, Boone County stands out as having a higher percentage of 
employment in the county than population.  Boone also stands out for having employment in 
Manufacturing, Transportation and Warehousing and Wholesale Trade as being concentrated in 
that county.   
 
Transportation and Warehousing 
 
 Transportation and Warehousing is clearly an important industry to Northern Kentucky 
and Boone County particularly.  The clear concentration of this industry in Boone County is 
related to a number of factors:  first, the high concentration of Manufacturing and Wholesale 
Trade employment; second the transportation access provided by both the Airport and the access 
to I-75 and I-71.   The I-275 bypass also provides access to I-74.   
 
 Very few estimates for elasticity of heavy trucks to tolls exist in the literature.  The 
Hirschman et al. (1995) paper provides some estimates, however I am skeptical that they apply 
well to the situation here.  The Hirschman et al. (1995) paper studied tunnels and bridges into 
Manhattan.   This is a markedly different situation than a toll on a major through highway used 
by the Transportation and Warehousing industry.  The results in that paper varied from an 
elasticity of zero to an elasticity of -0.60.   The highest elasticity was associated with a bridge 
which had nearby “free” substitutes.  This does demonstrate that trucking will substitute for 
different bridges.  In the case of Cincinnati, this would most likely be the I-471 Bridge and the 
two bridges for the I-275 bypass.   
 
 Figures 5 through 7 plot Class Single Unit, Class C and Class D truck traffic by time for 
weekdays.  Weekend patterns are much smoother over time.  Single unit trucks are likely making 
short trips associated with local deliveries.  As is apparent in Figure 5 these have a “commuter” 
pattern where there is high northbound usage in the morning and high southbound usage in the 
late afternoon.  This appears to represent deliveries out of Northern Kentucky into Cincinnati.  
Class C (multi units with a single trailer) traffic has a surprisingly southbound bias throughout 
the day, with traffic peaking near late morning.  While Class C (single trailer) traffic has a very 
flat time distribution.  Class D traffic seems to be a mixture of the two.  It has a northbound bias 
35 
 
in general, but peaks in mid-morning for northbound and peaks in late afternoon for southbound, 
although there is a secondary northbound peak in the early evening.  These patterns may 
represent large Less than Truckload (LTL) firms moving material to various hubs within the 
Cincinnati area. Boone county industries may be relying upon the Brent Spence Bridge for 
transportation of goods into Cincinnati and likely to northern destinations such as Dayton and 
Columbus and possibly further.  The Cincinnati area is highlighted as a major trucking and 
transportation hub with firms located in Ohio and Indiana as well.  
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 According to The Truckers Report, the largest cost of trucking operations is fuel cost 
(accounting for 39% of operating costs and about $0.54 per mile).  The second largest operating 
expense was driver salary accounting for 26% of total operating costs and estimated at $0.36 per 
mile.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, truck drivers have an average hourly wage of 
$19.40 and a median hourly wage of $18.37.  Estimates of the hourly cost of operating a truck 
range from $40 to $60 per hour depending on the type of truck and the type of load. The truck 
report places all tolls, permits and licenses as 2% of overall expenses and estimates $0.02 per 
mile.  Based on these numbers we construct three “trips” associated with the Brent Spence 
Bridge: a short trip of approximately 20 miles (this would be comparable to driving from Boone 
county to locations within the Cincinnati MSA in Ohio and Indiana), a medium trip of 75 miles 
(comparable to a drive to Dayton from Boone County), and a trip of 175 miles (which would be 
a round trip of 350 miles, taking most of a day).  Using the data above, Table 3.4 presents our 
estimates of costs from the labor and gasoline components for each of these type trips. Toll costs 
vary by type of truck.  Current proposals are for $3 to $6 for light trucks and $5 to $10 for heavy 
trucks.  It is likely that light trucks will be more likely to take shorter trips, while heavier trucks 
are more likely to take the longer trips.  However, we present our estimates for trip type in all 
cases. 
 
38 
 
 
 
Table 3.4:  Trucking Cost Estimates by Length of Trip 
          
 
No time change No Toll $3 Toll $6 Toll $5 Toll $10 Toll 
Trip 
Length No Toll $3 Toll $6 Toll $5 toll $10 toll 
3 min 
gain 
6 min 
gain 
3 min 
gain 
6 min 
gain 
3 min 
gain 
6 min 
gain 
3 min 
gain 
6 min 
gain 
3 min 
gain 
6 min 
gain 
Short $18.00 $21.00 $24.00 $23.00 $28.00 $16.00 $14.00 $19.00 $17.00 $22.00 $20.00 $21.00 $19.00 $26.00 $24.00 
Medium $67.50 $70.50 $73.50 $72.50 $77.50 $65.50 $63.50 $68.50 $66.50 $71.50 $69.50 $70.50 $68.50 $75.50 $73.50 
Long $157.50 $160.50 $163.50 $162.50 $167.50 $155.50 $153.50 $158.50 $156.50 $161.50 $159.50 $160.50 $158.50 $165.50 $163.50 
 
 
Table 3.5: Percent Change in Truck Traffic  
           
  
No time Gain No Toll $3 Toll $6 Toll $5 Toll $10 Toll 
Elasticity Trip Length 
$3 
Toll $6 Toll $5 toll $10 toll 
3 min 
gain 
6 min 
gain 3 min gain 
6 min 
gain 3 min gain 
6 min 
gain 3 min gain 
6 min 
gain 
3 min 
gain 
6 min 
gain 
 
Short -1.7% -3.3% -2.8% -5.6% 1.1% 2.2% -0.6% 0.6% -2.2% -1.1% -1.7% -0.6% -4.4% -3.3% 
-0.1 Medium -0.4% -0.9% -0.7% -1.5% 0.3% 0.6% -0.1% 0.1% -0.6% -0.3% -0.4% -0.1% -1.2% -0.9% 
 
Long -0.2% -0.4% -0.3% -0.6% 0.1% 0.3% -0.1% 0.1% -0.3% -0.1% -0.2% -0.1% -0.5% -0.4% 
                
 
Short -5.0% -10.0% -8.3% -16.7% 3.3% 6.7% -1.7% 1.7% -6.7% -3.3% -5.0% -1.7% -13.3% -10.0% 
-0.3 Medium -1.3% -2.7% -2.2% -4.4% 0.9% 1.8% -0.4% 0.4% -1.8% -0.9% -1.3% -0.4% -3.6% -2.7% 
 
Long -0.6% -1.1% -1.0% -1.9% 0.4% 0.8% -0.2% 0.2% -0.8% -0.4% -0.6% -0.2% -1.5% -1.1% 
                
 
Short -8.3% -16.7% 
-
13.9% -27.8% 5.6% 11.1% -2.8% 2.8% -11.1% -5.6% -8.3% -2.8% -22.2% -16.7% 
-0.5 Medium -2.2% -4.4% -3.7% -7.4% 1.5% 3.0% -0.7% 0.7% -3.0% -1.5% -2.2% -0.7% -5.9% -4.4% 
 
Long -1.0% -1.9% -1.6% -3.2% 0.6% 1.3% -0.3% 0.3% -1.3% -0.6% -1.0% -0.3% -2.5% -1.9% 
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 We have very little data available on trucking costs.  Data of this nature is generally 
closely held by the firm for competitive reasons.  However, similar to the commute data, we can 
consider three factors: time cost for drivers and travel time, fuel costs plus the toll.  This likely 
understates the typical cost of a delivery run, but provides some context for the likely impact.  
The choice of elasticity is complicated.  Like the commuter discussion above, we care less about 
the use of the specific bridge rather than whether the toll will cause a decrease in traffic.  
Similarly though, we also care about a long run effect where firms may choose to relocate.  Here 
though, this seems unlikely: the high concentration of manufacturing, the location of the major 
airport, and the fact that Cincinnati is a major city make it unlikely that firms will choose to 
relocate to other places.  The location of Cincinnati serves wide markets in Kentucky, Tennessee, 
West Virginia, Ohio, and Indiana.  The nearest airport of comparable size is in the Detroit area.  
While one might be concerned about relocation to Louisville, given similar access to highways, 
the airport serves as an important anchor.  While the elasticities in the Hirschman 1995 paper are 
questionable, we use a variety of values within the range.  The lower elasticities are most likely 
accurate for the impact that the toll and new bridge will have on trucking, and it should be noted 
that this only applies to trips that are likely to use the Brent Spence Bridge.  Since most trucking 
firms in Boone County ship south and west as well (to destinations like Lexington, Knoxville, 
and Louisville), the overall impact on any firm will be even lower. 
 
 Table 3.4 presents the cost structure while Table 3.5 presents the percentage impact on 
trips involving the bridge.  As is quite clear, the highest impact of the toll will be for the shorter 
trips (where it is a larger percentage of the total trip cost) and of course for the highest elasticity. 
Even so, the overall impact is modest.  The worst-case scenario, where there is no time gain, 
using the highest elasticity and the $10 toll on short trips, we expect a reduction of 28% in trips.  
However, as noted above, it is much more reasonable to expect that there is some time gain.  We 
price this using a low estimate of the hourly cost of a trip: $45.  Hourly wages are $19, hourly 
gas costs are backed out from per mile costs and an assumed speed of 55 miles per hour.  As can 
be seen, if there was no toll, this would result in a net increase of as much as 11% in trips (six 
minute time gain for short trips).  As we consider the likely mix of time gain and toll cost, the 
worst case scenario would be a decrease of 22% if we use the highest toll cost, the 3 minute time 
gain and the highest elasticity (-.5).   
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 Most trucking companies would have a mix of trips.  Based on the counts used, Single 
Unit Trucks are approximately 38% of trucking usage on the bridge.  These most likely represent 
the shorter trips.  While Class C trucks are approximately 20% and Class D are approximately 
42%.   Class C and D trucks are more likely to be making the longer trips.  Because a number of 
alternative routes exist and because demand for these good will remain strong and transportation 
costs are a small percentage of the overall price of the goods, we expect that the -.1 elasticity is a 
far more reasonable expectation.  We find that in this case, estimates are quite small, typically 
less than 2%.   
 
 Overall, the impact on trucking will clearly be small.  Given the concentration of 
Manufacturing and Wholesale employment in the region, and the proximity of the airport, it is 
unlikely that firms will relocate.  This suggests that actually using the smallest elasticity is 
perhaps the most accurate.  As can be seen in that row, only the short trips with a $6 toll and no 
time gain have an impact over 1%. 
 
 As with commuting, the largest cost of any trucking trip is the time cost.  The likely gain 
in travel times, while very small even for long trips, significantly offsets the toll price. Further 
we are using a very low cost of time (other studies have used $50 to $60).  Recalling that in 
general, the combination of tolls and licenses are approximately 2% of trip costs for truck 
shipping, it is highly unlikely that the toll will have any significant impact on this important 
industry. 
 
Shopping and Recreational Trips 
 
 As noted above, Northern Kentucky in general has a slightly higher concentration of 
Retail Trade and Accommodation and Food Service than the Cincinnati region.  While it is 
important to recognize this fact, and it is important to discuss it, the difference between Northern 
Kentucky and the rest of the Cincinnati region is not particularly remarkable.  Indeed, with 20% 
of the population residing in Northern Kentucky, we would expect roughly 20% of the Retail 
Trade and 20% of the Food Service employment to be in Northern Kentucky if consumers shop 
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and eat close to home.  We note that 18.7% of the region’s Retail Trade and 19.9% of the Food 
and Accommodation employment is in Northern Kentucky suggesting that – if anything – 
residents in Northern Kentucky drive elsewhere to purchase retail goods but likely eat out near 
home.   Perhaps, since a large portion of residents commute into the city center, they make their 
retail purchases there rather than near home.   
 As further evidence of this we consider traffic flows on the bridge for the weekends.  The 
weekend traffic flows are more likely to be representative of trips made for shopping and other 
recreational purposes. Returning to Figure 4 below, we show that the commuting pattern is 
muted but still present.  Certainly some of this pattern is due to individuals who work weekends, 
but another component are individuals traveling into the city.  More importantly, we note the 
relatively symmetric traffic flows all day (as compared to weekdays).  If large numbers of 
consumers were driving from Ohio into Northern Kentucky via the bridge we would expect to 
see a complete reversal of the pattern.   
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 Returning to Table 3.3 we note that the percentage of Retail Trade employment in the 
three close-in counties (Boone, Kenton and Campbell) is 17.3% of the Cincinnati total, while 
population is 17.1%.  Finally, we note that for Boone County, Retail Trade is somewhat higher at 
8.2% as compared to 5.8% of population.  However for the remaining counties (including those 
not specifically listed) Retail Trade is a significantly smaller portion of employment than the 
population.  Certainly it is again Boone County that we would expect to see the largest impact on 
retail sales.  However, much of the Boone County shopping will derive from the other Northern 
Kentucky counties (as evidenced by the balance).  The large outlet shopping malls certainly 
bring in some customers from Ohio and Indiana, but they also draw customers from further 
south, west and east in Kentucky.   
 
 Accommodation and Food Service appears to be slightly more concentrated in the three 
close-in counties, accounting for 19.8% of the MSA employment in this industry.  Again, the 
concentration is primarily in Boone County as one might expect.  Again, we point to the fact that 
the 8.2% of employment in Accommodation and Food is nearly identical to the 8.3% of overall 
MSA employment in Boone County.  We also note that the other counties in the region have 
lower employment in this industry than their population or employment shares would suggest.  
This suggests that much of the concentration is due to customers from within Northern 
Kentucky, who clearly would not use the Brent Spence Bridge. 
 
 There are three possible scenarios which would account for the fact that the percentage of 
employment in Retail and Accommodation and Food in Northern Kentucky is nearly identical to 
the percentage of population.  The first is that no one travels across the river for shopping (or 
food).  Thus the numbers align closely because there is always a proportionate amount of 
employment for population.  The second is that while people travel across the river, the flow is 
completely symmetric with roughly equal numbers traveling into Northern Kentucky as travel 
out of it. The third is that consumers largely travel “north” to shop: that is consumers in Northern 
Kentucky shop in Ohio, while consumers in Kentucky drive north to Northern Kentucky to shop 
and that somehow these numbers serendipitously balance.   
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 In the first two scenarios, the new bridge and the toll will have no impact on retail 
shopping.  In the first case, with no crossings, the bridge plays no roll.  We acknowledge that this 
is highly unlikely given the traffic patterns, but it serves to begin the discussion.  In the second 
case – which is much more likely – the impact of the toll would be symmetric: while customers 
coming south over the river from Ohio and Indiana may decrease because of the toll, so too will 
consumers who travel North over the river from Northern Kentucky now remain in northern 
Kentucky to shop.    
 
 In the third scenario – which we argue is highly unlikely – the impact of the toll 
(assuming it reduces trips) would actually benefit Northern Kentucky shopping.  While the travel 
from points south (from other counties in Kentucky) would be completely unaffected by the toll, 
any reduction in those who travel into Ohio to shop would be induced to shop in Northern 
Kentucky (presumably closer to home). 
 
 Returning to Table 2.7 we point out that even at high elasticities, and worst case 
scenarios, the impact of the bridge toll on trips is small.  This is not surprising since even a $2 
toll is a relatively small price and the likely gain from improved traffic flow offsets at least some 
if not all of this cost.  This fact is no less true for individuals traveling for shopping or other 
recreational activities.  Indeed, as we can see in the table, the impact of the toll is lower when the 
overall cost of the trip in question is higher. It is actually quite reasonable to include the 
expenditure on shopping, food and entertainment associated with the trip into the base.  Clearly 
this would further reduce the impact of the toll (and the impact of the time gains).  Simply put, 
an individual who is driving from Cincinnati to Northern Ohio to shop at outlet malls is spending 
a great deal of money on this trip: the imposition of a $2 toll is going to have a very small 
marginal effect.   
 
 The economic literature on highways is quite clear that improvements in highways have a 
strong positive local impact on the economy.  While little literature specifically examines how a 
toll will mitigate this impact, the conclusion of that literature is that tolls do not significantly 
offset that impact.  Overall, improvements in highway infrastructure are typically found to have a 
positive impact on the local economy. 
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Implications of Sales Tax Financing 
 
An alternative to financing the Bridge with tolls is to increase the state sales tax.  Here we 
consider two possible scenarios: in the first, and most likely, both Ohio and Kentucky increase 
their sales tax keep the relative rates the same.   In the second, Kentucky raises its sales tax, 
while Ohio’s tax remains constant.  While we recognize the second case is rather unlikely, the 
remaining likely cases would be where both Ohio and Kentucky raise their sales tax, but 
Kentucky raises the tax by larger amount.   These middle cases can be understood to have 
aspects of both cases considered here.    
 
Retail sales, in general are rather price elastic: in contrast to the trip elasticities.  In 
general a 1% increase in prices leads to more than a 1% decrease in sales.  Estimates range from 
1% to 4% (see for example Fox, 1986; Walsh and Jones, 1988; Tosun and Skidmore, 2007).  In 
the first case, the sales taxes in both states are raised by the same proportion.  Transportation and 
warehousing is derived demand.   As retail sales in both regions fall, demand for the products 
shipped by trucking companies (and the manufacturing of these products would fall as well).  
Unlike the toll, however, the tax does not directly affect the trucking and other similar 
enterprises.   
 
Retail sales both north and south of the river would fall.  An increase in sales would 
reduce retail sales both from local consumers (those on the same side of the bridge) and from 
bridge crossers at the same rate.  This is in sharp contrast to the case of the toll which only 
impacts cross bridge consumers.   Clearly the increase would have a larger impact upon retail 
sales in northern Kentucky by the sheer volume of the consumers affected.   As noted above, it is 
unlikely that bridge crossing consumers make up a large part of retail sales in Northern 
Kentucky.   It is important to recognize here that the proportionate increase in both states would 
have no impact on the ratio of cross bridge shopping.  That is consumers traveling south across 
the Ohio River would decrease at the same rate as consumers traveling north: the impact is 
symmetric. 
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In the second case, where only Kentucky would increase the sales tax, the impact on 
Transportation and Warehousing in Kentucky would generally be smaller and indeed would most 
likely result in the lowest impact on Transportation and Warehousing in Northern Kentucky.   
The fact that the trucking in regional, serving Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana and Tennessee is the main 
reason for the low impact.  While certainly the tax in Kentucky would reduce retail sales in 
Kentucky, as Fox (1986) shows, Kentucky populations living near other states would increase 
shopping in those states to take advantage of lower prices.  Since large parts of the Kentucky 
population live near borders (Louisville, Paducah, Bowling Green), and the retail outlets on both 
sides of the border are served by the same trucking industry, the net impact on trucking would 
actually be smaller in this case. 
 
The net impact on Retail Sales in Northern Kentucky would be larger.  We get both the 
direct effect of a raise in prices, but we also would experience a larger decrease in consumers 
traveling to Northern Kentucky and an increase in consumers traveling to Ohio to shop.  This is 
in sharp contrast to the case where there is a general increase in both states.  In that case, only the 
direct effect occurs.   
 
An important question is whether the impact of an increase in sales tax would have a 
larger impact overall is difficult.  The toll would generally be spread over many years, while a 
sales tax option might be designed to pay for the improvements in a shorter period of time.  Were 
the sales tax option spread over the same period of time, the amount would likely be very small.  
However, this seems unlikely and policy makers tend to raise sales taxes in increments of at least 
0.25% (more likely .5% or a full 1%).   It is also likely that Kentucky would raise its rate, more 
than Ohio since Kentucky’s economy is smaller.  In order to raise the same nominal dollar 
amount, the tax rate in Kentucky would likely need to go up more.   Hence something closer to 
the second scenario, is most likely. 
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Component 4:  The Impact of the “Davis-Bacon” Prevailing Wage on the Cost of the Brent 
Spence Bridge Replacement. 
 
 The Davis Bacon Act requires workers to be paid a “prevailing” wage set by the Federal 
Government when Federal money is used in a project.  Some states, such as Kentucky and Ohio 
have a state specific “prevailing wage” rule which applies in the case when the Federal rule 
would not be in effect, but state funds are being used in the project.  In the case of the Brent 
Spence Bridge Federal and state highway money is being used, in part, and so prevailing wage 
rules apply.  Typically, these wages are higher than wages that would be obtained in the absence 
of such a requirement. A variety of studies have examined the impact of the Davis-Bacon 
prevailing wage on the costs of public projects.  The results of these studies are far from 
conclusive. 
 
 Some authors find a very high impact (Dean, 2009; Vitullo-Martin, 2012) while others 
find little or no significant impact on construction costs (Kessler and Katz, 2001; Azari-Rad, 
2003, Philips and Prus, 2003).  In general, it is certainly true that Davis-Bacon wages are higher 
than average wages for similar positions in most markets.  This appears to be true of Kentucky 
and Ohio in general (see below).  However, there may be employer responses which significantly 
dampen the impact as compared to the raw percentage differences in base wage rates.  One such 
possibility is for the firm to hire higher quality workers.  Certainly the union wage literature has 
found evidence of this practice when firms face unions.  A second possibility is to use workers 
more efficiently and hire fewer workers for the same type of project.  Substitution toward 
technology is well recognized as a general response to higher wages.  Again, the union wage 
literature has demonstrated this approach as well.  Finally, it may be that firms absorb higher 
costs in lower profits.  This is more difficult to measure and has been suggested but not well 
documented in the union wage literature.  However, it seems unlikely that the Davis-Bacon act 
would have no impact on the costs of construction. 
 
 We examined documents which suggest that the Prevailing Wage Laws in Kentucky 
results in wage differentials ranging from 10% to 40% (see, Kentucky Labor Cabinet, 2013, and 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) hourly wage estimates).  For example, according to the BLS 
wage data, Operating Engineers for highway and street construction in the Cincinnati 
Metropolitan area earn $25.11 per hour.  The Kenton County requirements for Operating 
Engineers range from $28.45 to $30.79 per hour, depending on the position (13% to 23%).  
Similarly, the average wage for construction laborers in Cincinnati is approximately $19.25 per 
hour, while the prevailing wage requirement would be between $26.72 and $27.22 per hour 
(38% to 41%).  It would be nearly impossible to get an accurate estimate of the increase in costs 
without knowing the specific mix of workers used for the project, which is well beyond the 
scope of this study.  However, based on other literature, it would seem that a 25% increase in 
hourly wage costs is not unreasonable. 
 
 Labor costs on construction projects range from 40% to 60% of total construction costs.  
At 40%, a 25% higher wage bill means the construction costs will be about 10% higher, while at 
60% we would find 15% higher costs.  Perhaps interestingly, a number of research studies 
appear to find roughly 10 to 15% higher overall costs associated with the Davis – Bacon act.   
This does not really appear to have any firm level response, although it is likely that firms will 
have some response.  We expect that the overall costs of the project are between 10 and 15% 
higher due to the Davis Bacon act.  
 
 Current estimates of the project place total construction costs at $1.8 million with an 
overall cost of approximately $2.6 million.    If the construction phase were 10% lower, the total 
costs would be $1.62 million for construction and $2.42 million for the total project.  At 15% the 
difference would be $1.53 million for construction costs and $2.33 million for the overall 
project.  These estimates are neither worst case nor best case estimates.  We suspect that in truth 
the savings would be slightly lower than we estimate, allowing for firm response. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Economic literature has long shown that highway improvement generally results in 
economic gains in the region.  We expect that overall, the Brent Spence Bridge project will not 
be remarkably different.  While certainly a toll will mitigate the impact of the project compared 
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to what might occur in the absence of the toll, both economic studies and our calculations 
indicate that the impact of the toll will be relatively small.   
 
 Overall, we expect that commuter patterns will change very little in response to the toll, 
largely because they are offset by time gains from the project and because they are a relatively 
small portion of the trip costs.  A crucial assumption in estimating this effect is how value of 
time is assessed.  While some studies associated with the Brent Spence Bridge project have used 
$14 to $16 per hour (and we present estimates based upon this as well), we find this figure to be 
remarkably low.  Average wages among commuters in the region and especially for likely Brent 
Spence Bridge users are in the range of $22 to $26 per hour.  For the higher wage workers, the 
gain in time from reduced congestion far outweighs the toll cost even for a $2 toll. 
 
 We examine the industry structure and discuss the likely impact of tolls on the economy 
of Northern Kentucky.  Northern Kentucky is home to a remarkably high concentration of 
transportation and warehousing employment.  Tolls on trucks will clearly impact this industry.  
We find the impact will be highest on short trip type deliveries.  Overall, the decrease in truck 
trips is likely to be small, around 2%, which implies a very small impact on trucking companies 
and the industry as a whole.  
 
 While Northern Kentucky does have high employment in both Retail and Food Service 
industries, the employment is proportional to population in general.  While certainly some 
customer base is travelling over the Bridge, it is symmetrically likely that some consumers local 
to Northern Kentucky shop in Cincinnati either for convenience or for the “excursion” value.  
While trips for shopping and other recreation are somewhat more sensitive to changes in prices, 
these trips too are inelastic.  The value of time is still the single largest component.  We estimate 
that the impact on retail sales will be relatively small and that some of it will be made up by local 
customers choosing to shop closer to home.   This is consistent with the finding that overall, road 
improvement improves employment and other economic activities, even in the presence of a toll. 
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Appendix Table 1:  Travel Time in Minutes between population centroids of Counties (MapQuest) 
  
Indiana Kentucky Ohio 
  
Dearborn Franklin Ohio Boone Bracken Campbell Gallatin Grant Kenton Pendleton Brown Butler Clermont Hamilton Warren 
Indiana 
Dearborn 
 
49 34 37 83 48 63 58 40 76 88 57 61 47 66 
Franklin 49 
 
75 64 109 69 90 85 67 100 109 55 82 56 74 
Ohio 34 75 
 
51 97 62 55 72 54 90 102 71 75 61 80 
Kentucky 
Boone 37 64 51 
 
62 27 31 26 19 50 67 56 40 31 59 
Bracken 83 109 97 62 
 
46 82 73 53 43 62 90 65 65 89 
Campbell 48 69 62 27 46 
 
47 42 17 37 52 50 26 25 49 
Gallatin 63 90 55 31 82 47 
 
30 38 57 86 75 60 51 79 
Grant 58 85 72 26 73 42 30 
 
33 35 81 70 55 46 74 
Kenton 40 67 54 19 53 17 38 33 
 
44 56 49 30 24 51 
Pendleton 76 100 90 50 43 37 57 35 44 
 
84 81 57 56 80 
Ohio 
Brown 88 109 102 67 62 52 86 81 56 84 
 
70 34 66 67 
Butler 57 55 71 56 90 50 75 70 49 81 70 
 
44 32 20 
Clermont 61 82 75 40 65 26 60 55 30 57 34 44 
 
39 40 
Hamilton 47 56 61 31 65 25 51 46 24 56 66 32 39 
 
33 
Warren 66 74 80 59 89 49 79 74 51 80 67 20 40 33 
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Appendix Table 2: Distance in Miles between population Centroids of Counties (MapQuest) 
  
Indiana Kentucky Ohio 
  
Dearborn Franklin Ohio Boone Bracken Campbell Gallatin Grant Kenton Pendleton Brown Butler Clermont Hamilton Warren 
Indiana 
Dearborn 
 
28.6 19.9 25.3 66.5 36.2 54.1 51.0 30.0 57.5 72.6 43.9 50.3 35.7 55.8 
Franklin 28.6 
 
48.8 51.3 86.3 53.3 80.1 77.0 56.0 76.7 89.6 33.7 68.1 43.6 49.0 
Ohio 19.9 48.8 
 
34.8 76.1 45.8 28.5 60.6 39.5 67.0 82.2 53.5 59.9 45.2 65.3 
Kentucky 
Boone 25.3 51.3 34.8 
 
49.5 18.2 26.8 23.7 13.0 33.3 55.6 42.7 33.3 22.6 47.3 
Bracken 66.5 86.3 76.1 49.5 
 
34.8 72.0 46.0 40.8 28.8 46.2 69.8 51.9 49.6 71.9 
Campbell 36.2 53.3 45.8 18.2 34.8 
 
41.6 38.5 10.3 25.6 41.7 37.2 19.4 17.1 39.3 
Gallatin 54.1 80.1 28.5 26.8 72.0 41.6 
 
19.4 35.2 41.4 77.9 65.0 55.6 44.9 71.7 
Grant 51.0 77.0 60.6 23.7 46.0 38.5 19.4 
 
32.0 19.1 74.6 61.8 52.4 41.6 68.5 
Kenton 30.0 56.0 39.5 13.0 40.8 10.3 35.2 32.0 
 
31.1 46.2 35.2 24.0 15.0 39.8 
Pendleton 57.5 76.7 67.0 33.3 28.8 25.6 41.4 19.1 31.1 
 
65.0 60.6 42.7 40.4 62.7 
Ohio 
Brown 72.6 89.6 82.2 55.6 46.2 41.7 77.9 74.6 46.2 65.0 
 
58.1 25.6 53.7 56.6 
Butler 43.9 33.7 53.5 42.7 69.8 37.2 65.0 61.8 35.2 60.6 58.1 
 
34.4 22.3 15.7 
Clermont 50.3 68.1 59.9 33.3 51.9 19.4 55.6 52.4 24.0 42.7 25.6 34.4 
 
31.3 32.0 
Hamilton 35.7 43.6 45.2 22.6 49.6 17.1 44.9 41.6 15.0 40.4 53.7 22.3 31.3 
 
27.9 
Warren 55.8 49.0 65.3 47.3 71.9 39.3 71.7 68.5 39.8 62.7 56.6 15.7 32.0 27.9 
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